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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida.] Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided throughout that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this
1. For a discussion of developments in appellate practice for 1993, 1995, 1996, and
1997, see Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L.
REv. 29 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1996
Survey of Florida Law, 21 Nova L. Rev. 13 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey]; Anthony C.
Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of Florida
Law, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Survey].
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article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
will examine those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases
relating to the preservation of particular issues, nor will it discuss the
question of whether particular errors were harmless.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
Chief Justice Major B. Harding of the Supreme Court of Florida issued
two administrative orders of significance to appellate practitioners. One
dealt with the impact of modem technology on Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.210, which states that the text of briefs "shall be printed in type
of no more than 10 characters per inch."2 The order noted that "[w]hile this
requirement may have made eminent sense in the early days of
computerization, it is difficult to justify, and sometimes impossible to honor,
in a day when computers instantaneously perform typographic functions
once available only to the most skilled manual typesetters." The order went
on to state that "[floremost among these functions is the ability to adjust
spacing so that individual characters take up only so much horizontal space
as is necessary" and that "[w]e are nearing the day when these
proportionately spaced fonts will be the only ones installed on most
computers." 4 The order indicated that the problems created by the new
technology are twofold: 1) because the number of characters per inch will
vary throughout the document, attorneys and court clerks are "left in a
quandary about whether briefs actually meet the rules' standards;" and 2)
"briefs should not circumvent the 5page-length requirements through the
simple expedient of adjusting fonts."
Noting that the supreme court had referred the matter to the Florida
Appellate Court Rules Committee for modifications to the existing rule, the
order adopted "a clear-cut interim solution to this problem" 6 It did so by
stating that no typed brief shall be rejected for failure to comply with the
font requirements if it meets the following criteria:
2. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(2).
3. Order on Rule 9.210, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chief Justice Major B.
Harding (on file with author).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
1998
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(1) It is reproduced in a font that is:
(a) 12 point type or larger if the font is not proportionately
spaced, provided the font does not exceed ten characters
per inch, or
(b) 14 point Times Roman (or similar) type or larger if the
font is proportionately spaced; and
(2) It includes a statement certifying the size and style of type
used in the brief (e.g., 14 point proportionately spaced
Times Roman; 12 point Courier New, a font that is not
proportionately spaced). 7
The order further notes that its criteria are modeled after the requirements of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit8 and may be
interpreted in light of them.9
The other order established a uniform case numbering system for the
Florida court system. 10 It directs that the appellate courts are to implement
the new system by January 1, 2000, and that trial courts may implement it as
early as January 1, 1999.1 Furthermore, the courts must implement a
uniform case numbering system before providing the public with access to
court data via the Internet or by January 1, 2003, whichever occurs first. 
2
Supreme court case numbers will begin with "SC," while district court cases
will begin with the number of the district, followed by the letter "D."'13 The
court designation will be followed by the year and then by sequential five-
digit numbers that will start with "00001" each year.14 For example, the first
case in the First District Court of Appeal in 2000 will be numbered
1D200000001. A similar approach will be taken with regard to county and
circuit court cases, with each county being identified by an assigned two-
digit code at the beginning of the case number and with the addition of two-
7. Id.
8. 11 th Cir. FED. R. App. P. 28-2(d) & 32-4.
9. Order on Rule 9.210, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chief Justice Major B.
Harding (on file with author).
10. Order, Chief Justice Major B. Harding (on file with author).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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letter designations for court types.15  There will also be optional branch
16location and party/defendant identifiers.
The order stated:
[s]uch a system is required to ensure that, in this age of technology,
case numbers include unique identifiers that easily distinguish the
origin of a case, type of case, year of filing, and numerical
sequence of a case when case numbers are displayed externally in
an automated format for public access.
7
lIn. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
In State v. Matute-Chirinos,1s the State sought certiorari in the third
district to review a pretrial ruling in a capital murder prosecution.' 9 Pursuant
to a request by the state, the district court certified the case as one having
great effect on the administration of justice throughout the state requiring
immediate resolution by the supreme court.20
The supreme court noted that the provisions of Article V, section
3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution, which allow it to review trial court
decisions that are passed through district courts by certification, states that
the court:
[m]ay review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the
district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great
public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to
require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
The court then found that "[t]his provision does not give this [c]ourt
jurisdiction to accept a certification by a district court except in cases in
which an appeal is pending."22 Since the case at issue had been before the
district court on a petition for a writ of certiorari, the court found that the
15. Order, Chief Justice Major B. Harding (on file with author).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 713 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1998).
19. Id. at 1007.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1007 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5)).
22. Id.
1998
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constitutional provision did not provide it with jurisdiction.23 The court
noted that it had previously accepted jurisdiction under similar
circumstances in State v. Hootman24 and concluded that the decision to do so
25had been erroneous.
IV. APPEALS FROM COUNTY COURTS TO DISTRICT COURTS
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. U.S.A. Diagnostics,
Inc.,26 a county court denied a motion to compel arbitration but certified to
the fourth district, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(b)(4), a question of great public importance. 27 The appellate court
asked the parties to address the question of whether it had jurisdiction and
both responded by seeking to have the court rule on the merits of the case
and to answer the certified uestion. 28 "We can do so only if we have
jurisdiction," the court stated. "We do not," it concluded.30
The court recognized that its jurisdiction under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4) to review county court orders certified to
be of great public importance is limited to final orders31 and to non-final
32orders otherwise appealable to the circuit court under Rule 9.140(c), which
deals with appeals by the state in criminal cases.33 Since the order on the
motion to compel arbitration was neither final nor an order under Rule
9.140(c), the court found that it "does not have discretionary jurisdiction to
review this certified question. ' 34 Rather, the court pointed out, "appellate
jurisdiction of non-final orders [entered by county courts] that determine
entitlement to arbitration lies in the circuit courts. 35  Accordingly, the
appeal was transferred to the appropriate circuit court.36
23. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d at 1007.
24. 709 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1998).
25. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d at 1007.
26. 696 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
27. Id. at 1334.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(A).
32. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(B).
33. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(4)(B).
34. State Farm, 696 So. 2d at 1335.
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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V. APPELLATE REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS
The third district held in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez 37
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a hearing
officer's order upholding a citation for a county animal control violation.
38
The court relied on the fact that the county code provided that a violator or
the county could seek to overturn the order of the hearing officer by making
application to the county court for a trial de novo on the merits.3 9 The court
found that the county was authorized by sections 162.13 and 162.21(8) of
the Florida Statutes to adopt such a method of review.40
In quashing a circuit court decision that had reversed the hearing
officer's determination, the third district stated that while it "sympathize[d]
with and appreciate[d] both Mr. Hernandez's and the County's frustration
with the amount of time, energy and heartache this case has caused," it
"believe[d] that the proper course will at last be followed, which will clear
this matter up for both parties."4'
In Oceania Joint Venture v. Ocean View of Miami, Ltd.,42 a petitioner
sought certiorari review in the third district of an order from the appellate
division of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denying a motion for
reinstatement of an appeal. 43 The petitioner asserted that a prior order of
dismissal based on the failure to join an indispensable party was void
because it had been entered by only one circuit judge, rather than by a three-
judge panel as required by a local rule.44
The petitioner did not raise the issue regarding the local rule at the time
the motion to dismiss was considered, neither in a certiorari petition that
sought review of the dismissal order in the third district, nor in a subsequent
certiorari petition that requested the supreme court to order the district court
to accept jurisdiction and reverse the circuit court's order.45 The third
district rejected the petitioner's contention that the local rule was
jurisdictional in nature and that a claim that it was violated could therefore
be raised at any time.46 In denying certiorari, the court said:
37. 708 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
38. Id. at 1009.
39. Id. at 1010.
40. Id.
41. Hernandez, 708 So. 2d at 1011.
42. 707 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
43. Id. at 918.
44. Id. at 919.
45. Id. at 917.
46. Id. at 918.
1998
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[T]he three-judge panel requirement... is a rule of court that is
procedural rather than jurisdictional in nature. Consequently,
Oceania's failure to timely challenge, in its prior appeals, the order
of dismissal on the grounds that it was entered by one circuit judge
has resulted in a waiver of this issue.
4 7
VI. NONAPPEALABLE ORDERS
In Polk County v. Sofka, 48 a plaintiff obtained a verdict against the
county in a suit to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.49
Subsequent to the county's motion for a new trial being granted, the parties
executed a settlement agreement which provided for a judgment in the
plaintiff s favor.50 The agreement also provided that the county might seek
review of two appellate issues relating to the trial court's refusal to dismiss,
enter summary judgment for the county, or grant a directed verdict against
the plaintiff.5' The agreement further provided:
that the intermediate appellate court ha[d] jurisdiction to hear [the]
[county's] appeal... ;" that "[t]he record on appeal [would] be the
record as it exist[ed] at the time of the entry of the Stipulated Final
Judgment;" and that, "if the intermediate appellate court, for any
reason, determine[d] [that] there [was] no jurisdiction or standing, or if
the appeal [was] not dispositive of the issue of [the county's]
liability.... the Stipulated Final Judgment [would] be void, and the
parties [would] be entitled to again proceed to trial.
5 2
The second district affirmed the judgment and certified a question
relating to the merits of the case.53 The supreme court declined to answer
the question, concluding that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal5 4 The court noted that neither side had requested that the order
granting a new trial be set aside and that the county be permitted to withdraw
its motion.55 The court therefore found that the county, "having requested
47. Oceania Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d at 918-19.
48. 702 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1997).
49. Id. at 1244.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Polk County v. Sofka, 675 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Sojfka, 702 So. 2d at 1245 (Fla. 1997).
55. Id. at 1244.
[Vol. 23:1
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and received a new trial," was "deemed to have waived its right immediately
to seek appellate review of rulings made prior to, or during, the previous
trial."56
The court recognized that the parties had stipulated to the district
court's jurisdiction, but pointed out that "'parties cannot stipulate to
jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists.' 57 The court also
agreed with a statement made by the parties in a joint brief on the
jurisdictional question that the court's conclusion "'will result in a waste of
judicial resources."' 58 In light of the fact that courts are bound to take notice
of the limits of their authority and to notice jurisdictional defects and enter
appropriate orders,59 however, the court found the waste of judicial resources
to be regrettable but unavoidable.
60
In Hastings v. Demming, the supreme court found that "[n]onfinal
orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers' compensation
immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order specifically states
that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to a party. 62 The
63decision approved the district court decision under review and disapproved
the decisions in Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger6 4 and City of Lake
Mary v. Franklin65 to the extent that they are inconsistent with the reasoning
expressed in the opinion.
66
Cases in which district courts held that orders were not appealable
include Health Care Associates, Inc. v. Brevard Physicians Group, P.A., 67
(confirming in part and modifying or vacating in part an arbitration award);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bravender,68 (assessing
attorney's fees as the result of discovery misconduct); Rowell v. Florida
Department of Law Enforcement,69 (refusing of the Florida Department of
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1245 (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181
(Fla. 1994)).
58. Id. at 1244.
59. Soflca, 702 So. 2d at 1244 (quoting West 132 Feet v. City of Orlando, 86 So. 197,
198-99 (Fla. 1920)).
60. Id.
61. 694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997).
62. Id. at 720.
63. Hastings v. Demming, 682 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
64. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
65. 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
66. Hastings, 694 So. 2d at 720.
67. 701 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
68. 700 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
69. 700 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1998
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Law Enforcement to certify an individual's eligibility to have her criminal
record sealed); Park Imaging, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurance Co.,7° (granting
partial summary final judgment providing that the amount of money an
insured's insurance company had to spend on costs and expenses in
defending the insured, including attorney's fees, would reduce the insurance
company's monetary limit of liability insurance by the amount of those costs
and expenses); Gomez v. Gomez,71 (non-final order granting wife's motion to
join her brother-in-law as a defendant in her dissolution action); Kalantarilv.
72Kalantari, (granting interlocutory order denying a motion to set aside an
antenuptial agreement); Estate of Nolan v. Swindle,73 (authorizing previously
appointed administrator ad litem to file an action seeking to set aside will
and revocable living trust on the ground that beneficiaries had exercised
undue influence); Lynbrook Court Condominium Ass'n. v. Arana,
74
(determining that a case had not been dismissed, entered subsequent to an
order stating that the case shall stand dismissed thirty days from the date of
the order unless it appeared that the matter was diligently being prosecuted
within that thirty day period); Caribbean Transportation, Inc. v. Acevedo,75
(order stayinF action and retaining jurisdiction pending arbitration); Salzverg
v. Salzverg, 6 (bifurcating order which simply dissolved the parties'
marriage); and, Thomas v. Silvers,77 (denying motion to dismiss for failure to
serve complaint within 120 days as required by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.070(i)).78
VII. FINAL ORDERS
In Hills v. State,79 the first district rejected a claim that an order
approving mental treatment pursuant to section 916.107(3) of the Florida
Statutes was non-final because it was only effective for a period of ninety
days, and the appellee could once again petition to continue treatment once
this period had expired.8° The court determined "that this potentiality does
70. 700 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
71. 702 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. 711 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
73. 712 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
74. 711 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
75. 698 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
76. 696 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77. 701 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
78. The court certified conflict with Mid-Florida Assoc., Ltd. v. Taylor, 641 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and Comisky v. Rosen Management Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
79. 699 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
80. ld. at 736.
[Vol. 23:1
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not render the order at issue nonfinal, since it clearly marked an end to
judicial labor as to the matters then pending before the trial court. 81
82The fourth district, in Roshkind v. Roshkind, addressed the issue of
whether a post-dissolution final order in a modification proceeding "is a
final judgment, to be appealed by plenary appeal, or an order entered after
final judgment, reviewable as a non-final appeal under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(4)."83
The court noted that although case law "would support an argument that
petitions for modification are not independent actions, the orders entered in
modification proceedings have all the aspects of final judgments. 84 The
court therefore concluded that such orders are final judgments, subject to
motions for rehearing under the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a),
85
and appealable as plenary appeals.
The fourth district also examined the question of finality in the context
of appeals taken by persons who were not parties to the proceedings in the
86lower tribunal. In Shook v. Alter, a lawyer representing a party in the trial
court sought certiorari review of an order holding him in indirect civil
contempt. The district court entered an order redesignating the petition for
88writ of certiorari as a final appeal. The court noted that the distinction was
important because a petitioner seeking certiorari carries "a heavier burden
than an appellant must carry on appeal., 89 The court indicated that it was
publishing its order "so that the Bar will know that, where a final order is
entered against a non-party such as, for example, a lawyer or a witness, the
appropriate method for review of that order is by final appeal."
9 °
The petitioners in Borja v. Nationsbank of Florida9l sought mandamus
to compel the trial court to amend a final judgment that inadvertently
92
omitted the names of some of the parties to the action. Due to the
omission, the petitioners claimed that a final judgment was never entered
81. Id.
82. 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
83. Id. at 544.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 715 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Id. at 1082-83.
88. Id. at 1083.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 698 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 280.
1998
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against the omitted parties. 93 The respondents maintained that the omissions
were merely technical errors that did not affect the finality of the judgment.94
The third district found the omissions to be "a mere clerical error" that
would not affect the judgment's finality.95 Accordingly, the court directed
the trial court to amend the judgment to include the names of the omitted
parties nunc pro tunc on the date of the original final judgment.
96
VII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Raysor v. Raysor,97 the first district encountered a situation in which
a notice of appeal was mailed to the post office box maintained by the clerk
of the lower tribunal five days prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period
established by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(b) for the filing of
98
such notices. The notice was not filed with the clerk, however, until the
morning after the thirty day period expired.99
The court rejected the appellant's argument that the facts established
that the notice of appeal was delivered to the clerk's post office box on the
final day of the thirty day period. 1°° The court went on to indicate that even
if it was assumed that the notice did reach the post office box on the thirtieth
day, "we would conclude that [the appellant] nonetheless failed to timely
'file' the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court."''1 The court
further noted that "[g]enerally, a paper is deemed to be 'filed' when it is
delivered to the proper official and received by that official to be kept on
file," and concluded that "merely mailing the notice or having the notice
placed in a post office box within the required time period is not
sufficient."'
0 2
The court then went on to state:
By publishing this opinion, our intent is not to single out counsel
for appellant, who by all appearances mailed the notice of appeal in
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Borja, 698 So. 2d at 281.
97. 706 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id. at 400.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 401.
101. Id.
102. Raysor, 706 So. 2d at 401 (citing Blake v. R.M.S. Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
[Vol. 23:1
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/2
Musto
a manner that under ordinary circumstances would have resulted in
timely receipt by the clerk. On the contrary, given the relative
frequency with which situations such as this occur, our purpose is
to reiterate the point that one who foregoes the opportunity to
personally deliver time critical documents to the clerk, and instead
elects to entrust those documents to postal authorities or some
other delivery mechanism, does so at his or her own peril.
10 3
The fourth district in Bove v. Ocwen Financial Corp.,'° 4 denied a
motion to amend a notice of appeal that timely sought review of a final
judgment. 1°5 Some two months after the filing of the notice, the trial court
entered a judgment taxing costs.1° 6 After the time for appealing the cost
judgment had expired, the appellants moved to amend the notice of appeal so
as to allow them to appeal the cost judgment. 10 7 In the motion, the appellants
stated that they were not seeking reversal of the cost judgment except in the
event the final judgment was to be reversed.
0 8
The court found that it "must deny the motion to amend the notice of
appeal on jurisdictional grounds because no notice of appeal was filed within
[the time for appealing] the cost judgment."'1 9 The court went on to suggest
an alternative method of dealing with similar situations:
Having to file a separate notice of appeal from a judgment for
costs or attorney's fees, entered after a notice of appeal has already
been filed from the main judgment, requires, of course, the
payment of an additional filing fee. Where, as here, the only
reason for appealing the second judgment is in the event the main
judgment is reversed, parties should consider stipulating that the
second judgment would be vacated if the main judgment were
reversed. Such a stipulation would not only save the appellant the
additional filing fee, but would also save both parties attorneys'
fees and would not expose the appellee to having to bear the cost of
that filing fee in the event the cost judgment is reversed.'10
103. Id.
104. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D564 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998).
105. Id. at D564.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at D564-65.
109. Bove, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D565.
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
1998
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In Turner v. City of Daytona Beach Shores,'I I the fifth district
dismissed an appeal in which the notice of appeal was untimely, rejecting the
appellant's claim that he had filed an earlier, premature, notice of appeal.
1 2
The document referred to by the appellant was a pleading entitled "Motion
to Strike the Sham Pleadings by Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs Notice of
Hearing and Defendant's Entry of a Order for Final Summary Judgment In
the Alternative, A Notice of Appeal," the last paragraph of which stated,
"The Plaintiff herein is providing a Notice of Appeal, if the Court issues an
Order in favor of the contemptuous Attorney and the Defendants."" 3
The court found, the purported notice "does not even come close to
complying with the requirements of Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure
9.110(d) and 9.900(a), and glaringly omits 'the name of the court to which
the appeal is taken.""' 4 The court recognized that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.110(m) "allows for some leeway for premature appeals," but
interpreted the rule to require "some previous action by the trial court about
which an appellant wishes to complain.""15 The purported notice having
been filed "before any appealable decisions were rendered by the trial court
and five months before any of the defendants filed a motion leading to the
final judgment from which the appellant tardily filed an appeal," the appeal
was dismissed."
16
Several cases dealt with the question of whether the filing of particular
motions in the trial court delayed the rendition of an order, so as to make
timely a notice of appeal filed within thirty days of the order denying the
motion, but more than thirty days after the order appealed from.
Some examples include: 1) motion for clarification directed to final
order of dismissal did not delay rendition;" 7 2) motion to set aside final
judgment was intended to operate as a motion for rehearing and suspended
rendition;" 8 3) pending motion to amend complaint, filed prior to entry of
summary final judgment, did not stay rendition of the judgment, despite the
fact that the trial court had reserved ruling on the motion; 119 4) motion for
rehearing directed to a circuit court order granting a stay of a driver's license
111. 702 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
112. Id. at 632-33.
113. Id. at 633.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Turner, 702 So. 2d at 633.
117. Tyler v. State, 718 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
118. Olson v. Olson, 704 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
119. DiPaolo v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 700 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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suspension did not delay rendition because motions for rehearing are not
authorized with regard to non-final orders; 120 5) motion for reconsideration
after a final summary judgment, although mislabeled, was in substance a
proper motion for rehearing and thus suspended rendition; 12 6) motion for
rehearing was unauthorized, and rendition was not delayed by its filing
because order denying arbitration was non-final; 122 and 7) post-judgment
contempt order in a dissolution proceeding, although reviewable as an appeal
from a non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(a)(4) is actually a final order and motion for rehearing therefore delays
its rendition.
123
IX. STAYS
In St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe,124 the fourth district found to be
constitutional section 766.212 of the Florida Statutes which allows a district
court, in order to prevent manifest injustice, to stay an arbitration award
entered pursuant to section 766.207 of the Florida Statutes.12' The
defendants in the case claimed that the statute infringed on the supreme
court's exclusive authority to prescribe rules of procedure, in that it
abrogates the automatic stay provision of Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.310.126 The court disagreed, finding that in enacting the statute,
the legislature "created a modified right to judicial review of arbitration
awards,"' 27 review that "includes an equally substantive right to payment of
the award during review unless the court finds that a stay is necessary to
prevent manifest injustice.",2 1
In light of its interpretation of the statute, the court stated, "[w]e cannot
say that such substantive legislation infringes on the supreme court's power
to regulate procedures in appellate proceedings."129 The court went on to
120. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Bond, 696 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
121. Magnum Towing, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D850 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1998).
122. Josephthal Lyon & Ross, Inc. v. C & A Fin. Programs, Inc., 709 So. 2d 1384 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Remington v. Remington, 705 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
124. 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 1019.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d at 1020.
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certify "the question of constitutionality to the supreme court for its
definitive resolution."'3 °
The fifth district, in Department of Safety v. Stockman, 3 t dealt with the
issue of whether a circuit court has the authority to stay the administrative
suspension of a driver's license pending certiorari review by the circuit
court.
132
The court found that "the circuit court, as the direct reviewing court,
has the inherent power and discretion to suspend the administrative order,
pending certiorari review.' 33  Not according the circuit court this
discretionary power, the court recognized, would likely render review of
such orders "meaningless."' 134 To illustrate its point, the court noted that the
license suspension in the case under review was for six months.' 35 "If this
order could not be stayed pending review,"1 36 the court said, "the suspension
time, or a great deal of it, would likely run before the circuit court ruled on
the petition for certiorari review.'
137
The court rejected arguments based on sections 322.2615(13), 322.272,
and 322.28(6) of the Florida Statutes, interpreting those provisions as simply
providing no automatic stay pending review of a license suspension.!
38
In State Department of Environmental Protection v. Pringle,1 39 the first
district granted a motion to reinstate an automatic stay imposed by Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.3 10(b)(2)' 40 and vacated by the trial court.
141
The case involved an order enjoining state agencies from arresting
commercial fishermen for possessing and/or using certain fishing nets.
142
The appellees' motion to vacate the automatic stay was based on a sheriff's
affidavit which stated that he and other sheriffs were concerned about "rising
130. Id. (footnote omitted).
131. 709 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
132. Id. at 180.
133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stockman, 709 So. 2d at 180.
137. ld. at 180-81.
138. Id. at 180.
139. 707 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
140. The rule provides that the timely filing of a notice of appeal automatically operates
"as a stay pending review, except in criminal cases, when the state, any public officer in an
official capacity, board, commission, or other public body seeks review." FLA. R. APP. P.
9.310(b)(2).
141. Pringle, 707 So. 2d at 389.
142. Id. at 388.
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tensions" 143 regarding the issue and setting forth what the appellate court
termed "clear implication of possible violence" between fishermen and law
enforcement officers.
144
The court noted that the fourth district, in St. Lucie County v. North
Palm Beach Development Corp.,"45 had explained that the automatic stay is
based on a policy rationale and that automatic stays "should be vacated only• . ,,146
under the most compelling circumstances.
After considering the evidence, the court found "no compelling reason
to vacate the.., stay."'147 Indeed, the court indicated that granting a stay for
the reasons asserted "would impermissibly reward those citizens who would
use threats (implicit or otherwise) of violence in response to an unpopular
law, at the expense of those who would follow or attempt to lawfully
challenge or change the law within this state's democratic institutions.' 48
X. INDIGENCY
In Quigley v. Butterworth, 149 a prisoner serving a life sentence appealed
a circuit court's dismissal of his declaratory judgment action. 15 He moved
the district court of appeal to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis, and
the court transferred the motion to the circuit court for a determination of the
prisoner's indigency status. 151 The circuit court denied the motion because
the prisoner failed to meet the requirements of section 57.085 of the Florida
Statutes, which calls for prisoners seeking waiver of prepayment of court
costs and fees due to indigency to file an affidavit of indigency with the
court. 152 As a result of this ruling, the district court ordered the prisoner to
pay the appellate filing fee of $250.153
The prisoner then filed a second motion with the district court, entitled
"Appellant's Second Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal without
143. Id. at 389.
144. Id. at 390.
145. 444 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
146. Pringle, 707 So. 2d at 390 (quoting St. Lucie County v. North Palm Beach Dev.
Corp., 444 So. 2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 708 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1998).
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 270-71.
153. Id. at 271.
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Payment of Costs.' ' 154 The court again transferred the request to the circuit
court, which again denied the motion.155 Subsequently, the district court
dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the filing fee.'
56
The prisoner petitioned the Supreme court of Florida for mandamus to
compel the district court to reinstate his appeal and permit him to proceed in
forma pauperis.15 7 The supreme court agreed with the prisoner that his
second motion should have been treated as a motion for review of the circuit
court's initial denial under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.430.' 58
Relying on Rule 9.040(c),159 which provides that "[i]f a party seeks an
improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been
sought," the court transferred the cause to the district court "for
consideration of the denial of indigency status."' 
60
In Willis v. State,161 a criminal defendant who was represented by the
Public Defender at trial, was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent
to sell and filed a notice of appeal. 162 Ruling on the defendant's motion for
an order of insolvency applicable to the appeal, the trial court appointed the
Public Defender but required the defendant to pay the appellate filing fee• • 163
and the cost of the trial transcripts. Nothing in the record reflected that
the defendant had the ability to pay those costs.
64
After the first district dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the filing
fee, the defendant filed a financial affidavit showing that he had only twenty-
five dollars and sixty-three cents in his prison account and twice petitioned
the court to reinstate the appeal. 165 The district court directed the trial court
to reconsider the defendant's indigency status.' 66 That court reiterated its
prior order, stating that the defendant's affidavit was invalid because,
although it was sworn to and subscribed before a notary public, it was not
sworn to under penalty of perjury;' 67 that the defendant was unresponsive in
154. Quigley, 708 So. 2d at 271.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.040(c).
160. Quigley, 708 So. 2d at 271 (quoting FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(c)).
161. 708 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1998).
162. Id. at 940.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Willis, 708 So. 2d at 940.
167. Id.
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answering the questions on the affidavit;168 and that because the defendant
"'was not homeless, destitute or totally without assets' before his arrest and
because he was a known and convicted drug dealer, he must produce
'credible evidence to support the proposition that he was then or now totally
insolvent. ' ' ' 169 Pursuant to the trial court's order, the district court again
required the defendant to pay the filing fee to maintain his appeal. 7°
The defendant then petitioned the Supreme court of Florida for a writ of
habeas corpus to enable him to pursue his appeal.171 The court granted the
petition, stating:
[W]e find it difficult, if not illogical, to conclude that the trial court
could find the financial affidavit in this case to be valid and
sufficient to prove that Willis was insolvent for the purpose of
hiring appellate counsel but find the affidavit to be invalid and
insufficient to prove that he was insolvent for the purpose of paying
the filing fee and the transcript costs. If a financial affidavit was
properly executed for the purpose of granting the defendant public
assistance of counsel, it necessarily follows that the affidavit was
properly executed for all purposes. While a defendant may be
found indigent for the purpose of receiving public assistance of
counsel, yet solvent to pay other costs and fees, the record must
justify the order of partial indigency. Merely noting that a
defendant is a convicted drug dealer and not homeless is not, in our
view, a sufficient justification for declaring that person to be
solvent to pay filing fees and other costs.1
In Ferenc v. State,'73 a criminal defendant's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis in his appeal from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief
was denied based on the trial court's finding that the appeal was frivolous.
174
On appeal, the fifth district found this denial, apparently based on section
57.085(8) of the Florida Statutes (1995), 175 which authorizes trial courts to
dismiss frivolous proceedings instituted by indigent prisoners under certain
168. Id. at 940-41.
169. Id. at 941.
170. Id.
171. Willis, 708 So. 2d at 941.
172. Id.
173. 697 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
174. Id. at 1263.
175. Id.
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circumstances, to be improper because the statute does not apply to criminal-. 176
proceedings or collateral criminal proceedings.
A criminal defendant in Martin v. State177 argued that he should be
considered indigent for purposes of appeal based on his testimony that he
had a Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy case pending and that certain property
he owned was the subject of an action to foreclose a mortgage.'78 The fourth
district disagreed.
As to the bankruptcy claim, the court stated:
The mere fact that one has filed for relief under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code does not by itself establish indigency for
purposes of an appeal under section 27.52 [of the Florida Statutes].
For one thing, income earned by a debtor after filing for relief
under the bankruptcy law is not part of the bankruptcy estate. For
another Martin's unadorned claim of bankruptcy fails to address
exempt property under bankruptcy law.
Moreover, bankruptcy connotes insolvency. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, insolvency means that one's debts exceed the value of one's
property. In contrast, indigency under section 27.52 is related to
income or, alternatively, the ability of a defendant to pay for an
attorney without substantial hardship to the defendant's family.
Thus, without more, mere insolvency under bankruptcy law cannot
be equated with indigency under section 27.52.179
The court also addressed the foreclosure claim.
So too with the foreclosure. Knowing that a foreclosure
proceeding is pending with regard to real property owned by a
defendant in a criminal case hardly establishes the section
27.52(2)(b) standard for indigency. The record in this case does
not tell us, for example, the amount of the claimed debt in the
foreclosure proceeding; nor does it tell us the value of the property
to be foreclosed. For all we know, the value greatly exceeds the
debt, and [the] defendant has equity which he could use to pay for
an attorney. And even that, of course, fails to consider whether it is
176. Id.
177. 711 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
178. Id. at 119.
179. Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
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apparent that the mortgagee will ultimately prevail in the
foreclosure action.
180
The court also discussed "the question of transfers of property and
income by Martin to family members, including his mother."" The court
stated:
We do not believe that section 27.52 allows transfers of property
and money by a defendant to family members in order to create the
insolvency required for court-appointed counsel. To do so would
require the public to pay for lawyers for defendants whose
appearance of need was specifically created for that purpose. That
amounts to a fraud on the courts as well as the
taxpayers. Voluntary transfers of property to family members to
create indigency for the appointment of counsel are just as much
fraudulent conveyances as are such transfers by debtors to avoid
payment to their creditors.
182
In light of the above factors, and the existence of evidence that the
defendant's real property had been used for income producing purposes, the
fourth district upheld a circuit court determination that the defendant was not
indigent.
183
XI. FILING FEES
In Milligan v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners,'
84
the Supreme court of Florida upheld a circuit court's conclusion1 85 that
Florida's counties do not have to pay appellate filing fees on behalf of
indigent criminal defendants.
186
The court pointed out that "Article VIII, section l(b) of the Florida
Constitution provides that disbursement of county funds must be by general
law."'187  The court found "no provision in... any.., statute which
mandates that counties disburse funds to pay appellate filing fees on behalf
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Martin, 711 So. 2d at 120-21.
183. Id. at 121.
184. 704 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1998).
185. The fourth district had certified that the circuit court order passed on an issue of great
public importance requiring immediate resolution by the supreme court. Id. at 1051.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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,188
of indigent criminal defendants." Rejecting the comptroller's argument
that such disbursement was required upon an in pari materia reading of
certain statutes, the court found "that when the legislature has intended
counties to pay certain costs, it has expressly provided for such
disbursements." 89
The court found that its decision would only have prospective
application, "meaning that refunds of filing fees which counties have paid
before issuance of this opinion are not required."' 190 The court also, by
separate administrative order, "directed the clerks of the appellate courts to
stop collecting filing fees for cases filed on behalf of indigents beginning on
the date this opinion is issued [January 8, 1998]. " 191
The fourth district, in In re Payment of Filing Fees,' discussed the
situation that exists when a notice of appeal is filed without the payment of
the appellate filing fee. 19 3 The court recognized that "[b]ecause there is a
strict time deadline for filing a notice of appeal .... lawyers for parties taking
an appeal may be forced to act quickly to preserve the right but without
prepayment of these costs to the attorney by the client."' 194  The court
indicated that as a result, it often receives notices of appeal unaccompanied
by the fee,' 95 and that, in such cases, it routinely enters "an order directing
the attorney who filed the appeal to pay the filing fee or file a determination
of indigency.' 96  In an increasing number of cases, the court indicated,
attorneys have been failing to respond to these orders,197 and the court wrote
on the subject "to make a point in the hope that the practice will cease."
198
The court stated that "[the mere fact that the client is obligated to
reimburse the attorney for the costs advanced does not relieve the attorney of
the duty to tender the filing fees to this court when the appeal is initiated."'
99
The court continued, "consequently, we rightfully look to the attorney
initiating the appellate process to pay the filing fees due this court. ' '2°°
188. Id.
189. Milligan, 704 So. 2d at 1052 (footnote omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2341 (4th Dist Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1997).
193. Id. at D2341.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Payment of Filing Fees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2341.
198. Id.
199. Id. at D2342.
200. Id.
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The court went on to dispel the "mistaken assumption that a later
decision by the client not to pursue the appeal, and the filing of a voluntary
dismissal, will relieve the attorney of responding to our order for
payment. 2°1 The court noted "[t]he filing fee is an entry fee to the appellate
process, not a fee for prosecuting the appeal to a final result, °20 2 and stated
that "[w]hen the appeal is later abandoned, that is the decision of the litigant
and does not affect the liability for the fees due to commence the process. 20 3
The court also said:
We wish to make clear that we do not "bill" anyone, most
especially not clients, for payment of our filing fees. We instead
enter an order to the person filing the notice of appeal to pay the
filing fee (or produce an order of indigency) within 10 days or
sanctions will be imposed. The continued failure to pay is then a
failure to comply with an order of the court, not a mere failure to
respond to a bill from a creditor.
204
XIL. COUNSEL
205In Davis v. Meeks, the first district dealt with a situation in which two
attorneys jointly instituted an appeal on behalf of a client. 206 Subsequently, a
third attorney, who represented the client in related litigation, filed a notice
207
of appearance and a notice voluntarily dismissing the appeal. The two
attorneys who instituted the appeal moved to strike the notice of voluntarily
dismissal and to disqualify the third attorney, asserting that due to factors
pertaining to the related litigation, the attorney stood to gain if the judgment
against the client was upheld and that he therefore had a conflict of
* 208interest. The third attorney responded that he had discussed with the
client the benefits and detriments of proceeding with the appeal and that they
had jointly determined that the client's best interests were served by
dismissal of the case. 2°9  This response was accompanied by a sworn
201. Id.
202. Payment of Filing Fees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2342.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 709 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
206. Id. at 185.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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affidavit of the client, in which the client stated that she approved of the
filing of the notice of dismissal as it was her wish to have the appeal
dismissed.21°
The court found that although it was undisputed that the two attorneys
were at one time authorized to pursue the case, it was clear that any such
authorization had been revoked. The court concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances, determining who best represents her interests in this case is
not the province of this court, but rather of [the client] herself."212 "The
wisdom of her choice is not for us to decide," the court continued, "and the
consequences of that choice present issues for resolution in another forum on
another day. 213
XI. RECORD ON APPEAL
214In Fleming v. State, a criminal defendant moved for rehearing of the
second district's summary affirmance of his appeal, brought pursuant to215
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(i), claiming that he was denied
an opportunity to file a brief.21 6 The defendant cited Summers v. State,217 in
which the court ruled that summary records contemplated by the rule must
be paginated and indexed by the circuit court clerks according to the
218
requirements of Rule 9.200(d), and asserted that his case was decided
while he was awaiting the index from the clerk to use in providing proper
record citations in his brief.
219
The court noted that, subsequent to Summers, the rule at issue was
amended to require that briefs be filed within fifteen days of the filing of the
notice of appeal. 220 The court then stated:
We decline to apply the requirements of Summers under this
amended version of the rule because to do so would require that the
210. Davis, 709 So. 2d at 185.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 709 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
215. The rule sets forth the procedures to be used in appeals from summary denials of
motions for post-conviction relief.
216. Fleming, 709 So. 2d at 135.
217. 570 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
218. See Fleming, 709 So. 2d at 135.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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clerk index and paginate the record and send it to appellant, who
would then be required to file a brief, all within fifteen days of the
filing of the notice of appeal. No clerk in the district regularly
prepares summary records in this fashion and we do not believe the
rules intend that summary records be paginated and indexed.21
Noting that the defendant had conceded that the fifteen day requirement
postdated Summers and the defendant neither sought an extension of time for
his brief nor filed a motion asking the court how to reconcile the fifteen day
requirement with Summers, the court determined that the defendant had
222
waived his right to file a brief and denied rehearing.
XIV. TRANSCRIPTS
223In Guardianship of Halpert v. Rosenbloom, PA. the fourth district
"reluctantly" 224 reversed an award of attorney's fees because it failed to "set
forth findings as to the time reasonably expended, the hourly rate, or other
factors, if any, considered." 225 The court's reluctance stemmed from the fact
226that the trial court proceedings were not transcribed, meaning that a new
hearing would be required. 227 The lack of a transcript did not preclude
appellate review, the court found, because the reversible error appeared on
the face of the order.228
Although considering itself compelled by precedent to reverse, the court
stated that "[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might consider this error
harmless" or "[a]t a minimum, ... impose a waiver by the offended party's
failure to draw the error to the attention of the trial court.",
229
In Estopinan v. State, 23 there was a transcript of the trial proceedings,
albeit one that the second district termed as being "full of errors and
inaccuracies due to the poor performance of the court reporter."' 31 Because
221. Id. at 135-36.
222. Id. at 136.
223. 698 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
224. Id. at 939.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 940.
228. Halpert, 689 So. 2d at 939.
229. Id. at 940.
230. 710 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
231. Id. at 995.
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the appellant was "precluded from meaningful appellate review" due to the
"abysmal" transcript, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
2 32
XV. EXTENSIONS OF TIME
233In Publix Supermarkets, Inc., v. Arnold, an attorney filed a motion for
an extension of time, stating in the motion that he had contacted the
opposing counsel and that no objection to the request had been made.2 4
After the opposing counsel did file an objection which indicated that she had
not been contacted, the court ordered the attorney who filed the motion to
respond.235 The attorney indicated that when he signed his motion, he
believed that his assistant had contacted the opposing counsel and had
received no objection. 36
The court first pointed out that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.300(a) "contemplates that counsel, not a secretary or an assistant, shall
contact opposing counsel regarding an extension of time. '237 The court found
that "[t]he problem here is that appellant's counsel delegated this important
function to his assistant and then misrepresented to this court that it was he
who had made the contact.
'2 38
Because of counsel's failure to comply with the appellate rule and his
erroneous representations, the court, by separate order, directed counsel to
pay $250 to the clerk of the court.239 "In closing," the court stated, "we note
that, if a lawyer is too busy to personally contact opposing counsel to
determine whether there is an objection to a motion for an extension of time
for filing a brief, perhaps that lawyer is overextended." 240
The first district, in Stoutamire v. State,241 granted a motion for
extension of time to file an appellant's initial brief in an appeal from an
order summarily denying a motion for post-conviction relief. The court
232. Id. at 996.
233. 707 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
234. Id. at 1161.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Publix, 707 So. 2d at 1161.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1161-62.
241. 703 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
242. Id. at 1066.
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wrote "only to explain a change in the Rules of Appellate Procedure
concerning briefs in such cases."
243
The court noted that effective January 1, 1997, Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.140(g), which governed such appeals, was
redesignated as Rule 9.140(i) and amended to provide in pertinent part that
"no briefs. . .shall be required, but any appellant's brief shall be filed within
15 days of the filing of the notice of appeal." 244
The court then stated that although it was granting the motion for
extension of time despite the fact that it had been filed well after the fifteen
day period conterhplated by the rule,245 "we remind litigants that normally
motions for extensions of time to file a brief filed after the time for filing the
brief has expired, will not be granted."'246 Although most appeals governed
by the rule involved in the case "are handled by litigants pro se,"247 the court
stated that it "will not hesitate" 248 to apply its normal approach in such
proceedings. 249 "The fact that [litigants] are not represented by a lawyer
does not excuse them from complying with the procedural rules,"' 50 and, the
court continued, "[1]itigants should be on notice that in appeals pursuant to
Rule 9.140(i), the initial brief is due within 15 days from the filing of the
notice of appeal."' ' 1
XVI. DISQUALIFICATION OF APPELLATE JUDGES
In 5-H Corp. v. Padovano,252 the Supreme Court of Florida considered a
petition for a writ of prohibition that sought to prevent all of the judges of
the first district from presiding over the petitioner's appeal that was pending
in that courtY3 The petitioners' attorney had handled a prior, related appeal
in the first district, in which a panel of the court ruled against the attorney's
clients. 4 The attorney filed a motion for rehearing in which he "suggested
that the panel not only disfavored one of his clients, but also favored
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Stoutamire, 703 So. 2d at 1066.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Stoutamire, 703 So. 2d at 1066.
252. 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997).
253. Id. at 244.
254. Id.
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opposing counsel. 255  In addition, in referring to opposing counsel's
argument, the attorney argued that "'what is truly appalling is that... the
panel in the instant appeal would buy such nonsense and give credence to
such "total b[---]-s[---]. ' '256 Moreover, in a footnote, the attorney stated
that "'the use of the term "'total b[---]s[---]' without the inclusion of at least
2 or 3 intervening expletives is very kind and generous under the
circumstances."'
257
The court denied the rehearing motion,258 and then had its clerk forward
a copy of the motion to The Florida Bar to review the appropriateness of its
comments and language and to determine whether disciplinary proceedings
should be instituted against the attorney.2 9 Subsequently, The Florida Bar
filed a formal complaint against the attorney, who in turn reported the matter
to the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC).26° The complaint against
the attorney was dismissed upon a finding of no probable cause, while the
petition before the supreme court was silent as to what action, if any, was
taken on the report to the JQC.26'
In the appeal giving rise to the prohibition proceeding, the attorney, on
behalf of his clients, moved to disqualify the judges of the first district from
262presiding over the case. The motion asserted that such disqualification
was mandated in light of the circumstances of the prior appeal.263
Each judge on the court not otherwise disqualified considered the
264motion in accordance with In re Estate of Carlton, which calls for
appellate judges to determine for themselves "both the legal sufficiency of a
request seeking [their] disqualification and the propriety of withdrawing in
any particular circumstances." 265 Some of the judges voluntarily recused
themselves, but four of the remaining judges denied the disqualification
motion as legally insufficient.266
The supreme court denied the petition for prohibition, holding "that a
Florida judge's report of perceived attorney unprofessionalism to The
255. Id.
256. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
257. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 245 (citations omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 245.
263. Id.
264. 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979).
265. Id. at 1216.
266. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 24546.
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Florida Bar (or, conversely, an attorney's report of perceived judicial
unprofessionalism to the JQC) is, in and of itself, legally insufficient to
support that judge's disqualification. 267
The court pointed out that under the applicable ethical rules and canons,
"Florida judges, just like every other Florida attorney, have an obligation to
maintain the integrity of the legal profession and report to the Florida Bar
any professional misconduct of a fellow attorney." 268 It stated that the
petitioner's argument that the court should disqualify the district court
judges was "untenable ' 269 because "such a holding would not only contradict
both the letter and spirit of the canons and rules discussed above, but also
discourage Florida judges from reporting questionable attorney behavior to
the Florida Bar for fear of the possible repercussions (such as those sought in
the present case)." 270 The court continued, "Encouraging such reporting also
eliminates any incentive for an attorney to seek a Florida judge's
disqualification by intentionally provoking that judge into filing a report
with the Florida Bar. Simply stated, encouraging such reporting discourages
underhanded 'judge shopping' and 'forum shopping.' 271
In concluding that disqualification would not be compelled in the
context of an attorney filing a report with the JQC, the court relied on the
specific wording of Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E.(1) cmt.,272
as well as district court decisions holding that neither a party's expressed
intent to file a JQC complaint,273 nor the institution of a civil suit against a
judge, 4 constitutes a legally sufficient ground for recusal. The court
explicitly disapproved of other district court decisions that were inconsistent
with the court's opinion. 5
"Of course," the court added, "regardless of whether such reports to
The Florida Bar or the JQC have been filed, disqualification remains
available where it can be shown that 'the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.' ',276
267. Id. at 246.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 247.
270. Id.
271. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 247 (footnote and citations omitted).
272. Id. at 248.
273. Cherradi v. Andrews, 669 So. 2d 326 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
274. Dowda v. Salfi, 455 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
275. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 248.
276. Id. (citing Fla. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E(1)(a) (emphasis added by the court)).
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XVII. MOOTNESS
277In Kay v. Erskine, an appeal was taken from a circuit court order
vacating a county judge's blanket order of recusal in all cases in which
certain attorneys appeared as counsel.278 The fourth district reversed,
finding that the judge's resignation from the bench prior to the circuit court's
entry of the order had rendered moot the relief sought.279
280In Bostic v. State, the first district dismissed a criminal appeal as
moot due to the death of the appellant.281 The appellant's estate argued that
the appeal was not moot because the trial court had imposed a fine on the
282appellant that the State could attempt to collect from the estate. In light of
the State's representation that it would not attempt to collect the fine,
however, the court concluded that the appellant had not shown good cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed.
28P
The first district also found the death of a litigant to render an appeal
moot in Lund v. Department of Health.284 There, a doctor who was
appealing the suspension of his medical license died while the appeal was
285pending. His personal representative urged the court to decide the case for
the sole purpose of determining the appellant's right to prevailing party
attorney's fees under section 120.595(5) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1996).286
The court noted that "[a] generally recognized exception precluding
dismissal of an otherwise moot case occurs in situations wherein collateral
legal consequences affecting the rights of a party may flow from the issues
to be decided.' 287 This exception, the court continued, "applies to cases in
which the consequences consist of property, advantages or rights that the
appellant would lose as a collateral result of the lower court's decision if the
appellate court were to dismiss the appeal and allow the lower court's
decision to stand., 288 By contrast, the court found, the appellant hoped "to
277. 710 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
278. Id. at 752.
279. Id. at 753.
280. 708 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
281. Id. at 696.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 708 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
285. Id. at 646.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211,212 (Fla. 1992)).
288. Id.
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obtain a 'collateral legal benefit' that would arise.. .if the appeal were to be
decided in appellant's favor."
289
Concluding that the appeal was not moot simply to determine whether
the appellant was entitled to attorney's fees after prevailing on appeal
"would be a broad expansion of the concept of 'collateral legal
consequences,"' the court stated. 29° Declining to so expand the concept, the
court concluded "that the possibility of an attorney's fee award under section
120.595(5) is not a collateral legal consequence which would preclude
dismissal when the death of a party renders the appeal moot."
291
Another first district decision involving mootness was Physicians
Health Care Plans, Inc. v. State of Florida, Agency for Health Care
Administration.292 There, an appeal was taken from a final administrative
order denying a petition to initiate rulemaking.293 Approximately one week
before oral argument, the agency that had denied the petition instituted a
294proceeding to develop a proposed rule on the subject of the petition. The
agency candidly acknowledged that it was "not a coincidence that the
proposed rule development was initiated shortly prior to the date of oral
argument. 295
The court recognized that the agency's institution of the rulemaking
process came well after it was required by law.296 Because the appellant's
proposed rule could be considered by the agency in the newly instituted rule
development proceeding, however, the court found that the agency's belated
initiation of rulemaking granted the appellant all the relief that would have
been available on appeal. Accordingly, the case was dismissed as moot.
A mootness claim was rejected by the fourth district in Taxpayers
Ass'n. of Indian River County, Inc. v. Indian River County.299 In that case, a
circuit court dismissed petitions for certiorari that sought review of action of
a county commission regarding the purchase of a number of residential
lots.3°° The circuit court's decision was based on the fact that the county had
289. Lund, 708 So. 2d at 647.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 706 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
293. Id. at 113.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Physicians Health Care Plans, Inc., 706 So. 2d at 113-14.
298. Id. at 114.
299. 701 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
300. Id. at 898.
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already closed on the lots. The fourth district agreed with the petitioners'
claim that the issue was capable of repetition because the county might
purchase additional lots, a contention which the county did not deny.
Accordingly, the court found that "the dismissals for mootness were
improper.' 3°3
In Khazaal v. Browning, ° a default final judgment of foreclosure was
entered but shortly thereafter was redeemed. 0 5 On appeal, the appellees
contended that the case was moot because the payment resulting in
redemption was voluntary due to the fact that the appellant could have
moved for a stay pending review or posted a supersedeas bond.3°' The fifth
district, after first reiterating the concept it expressed in Great American
Insurance Co. v. Stolte307 that "there does not appear to be a rationale
underlying the rule that voluntary payment of the judgment renders the case
moot, precluding appeal while involuntary payment does not," disagreed3
The court stated, "payment by appellant in this case was involuntary in that
no stay was issued and payment was not made as part of a compromise, but
rather to preclude a foreclosure sale. '3°
XVm. STANDING
310
In Save Anna Maria, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, the
second district concluded that an environmental group had standing to
appeal from a Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") denial of a
request by the Department of Transportation ("DOT") for a dredge and fill
permit.3" Although the order under review actually granted the group's
motion to dismiss, DEP rejected a hearing officer's finding with respect to
the public interest, concluding instead that DOT did provide reasonable
assurance that the proposed project was clearly in the public interest. 312 The
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 707 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
305. Id. at 400.
306. Id.
307. 491 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
308. Khazaal, 707 So. 2d at 400.
309. Id.
310. 700 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
311. Id. at 16.
312. Id. at 115.
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environmental group argued that, left unchallenged, the decision would
become res judicata when the issue is revisited in court.313
Recognizing the general rule that parties cannot file proceedings to
review an order of judgment in their favor, the court indicated that the
question of whether the environmental group's appeal should be permitted
was "not an easy question to answer., 314 The environmental group urged the
view expressed in State Road Department of Florida v. Zetrouer315 that
"[t]he mere fact that a litigant secures a judgment in his favor does not
necessarily mean that there may not be some aspect of said judgment at
which he would be aggrieved and which would present grounds for review
by an appellate court."316 Noting that res judicata and collateral estoppel
concerns had been addressed in the context of a similar issue in General
Development Utilities, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission,317 the
court found that "[o]n balance, these authorities compel the conclusion that
[the environmental group] should be permitted to prosecute this appeal. 318
In Barnett v. Barnett,3 19 the fourth district dismissed an appeal arising
from a dissolution action. 320 A bank had moved, in the trial court, to
establish the priority of its lien over that of the parties' attorneys with
respect to the proceeds of the sale of a sculpture.321 It did not, however,
move to intervene or to consolidate its pending foreclosure case with the
dissolution action.322 The bank assigned to the wife any rights it might have
to appeal the order denying it priority, and the wife filed an appeal in her
capacity as assignee.
323
The court found that since the bank was not a party to the trial court
proceeding, it had no standing to appeal the adverse order. The court
noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(f)(1) defines
"'[a]ppellant' as a 'party who seeks to invoke the appeal jurisdiction of a
313. Id. at 114.
314. Id. at 115 (citing Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Blanchard, 234 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1970)).
315. 142 So. 217 (Fla. 1932).
316. Save Anna Maria, Inc., 700 So. 2d at 115 (quoting State Road Dep't v. Zetrouer,
142 So. 217, 218 (Fla. 1932)).
317. 385 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
318. Save Anna Maria, Inc., 700 So. 2d at 116.
319. 705 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).
320. Id. at 64.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Barnett, 705 So. 2d at 64.
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court, ' '' 325 and that "[tjhe general rule is that a non-party is a 'stranger to the
record' who cannot 'transfer jurisdiction to the appellate court."' 326 The
court distinguished the case from In re Receiverships of Guarantee Security
Life Insurance Co.327 based on the fact that in that case, "even though the
litigants were not parties to the statutory receivership proceeding, they had
standing on appeal to challenge the order that directly impacted the
development of the case in which they were named defendants.
32
The fifth district dismissed an appeal in Cocoa Academy for Aerospace
Technology v. School Board of Brevard County329 when the appellant was
not a legal entity, but simply the name of a program at a high school.330 The
court found that "[ilt is a basic premise that unless an in rem proceeding is
before the court, a cause of action must be conducted by or opposed by a
'person' recognized under the laws of this state.",331 Dismissing the appeal,
the court found that "[i]n the instant matter, only one party, the appellee,
School Board, is visible to this court, and Cocoa Academy of Aerospace
Technology, although designated as the appellant, is not.,
332
XIX. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
The fourth district, in Murphy v. International Robotics Systems, Inc.,33 3
discussed at length the subject of improper closing arguments that were not
objected to during trial, "in the hopes that a litigant considering an appeal to
this court, whose best hope for reversal is unobjected-to argument of
counsel, will carefully consider whether it is worth the cost."334 The opinion
noted that "[i]n the thirty-three years since this court was created, it has
never granted a new trial in a civil case grounded solely on improper
argument when there was no objection during trial., 335 It also pointed out
that "[a]lthough the Florida Supreme court has reversed for a new trial based
325. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(f)(1)) (emphasis added by the court).
326. Id. (quoting Forcum v. Symmes, 133 So. 88, 89 (1931)).
327. 678 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
328. Barnett, 705 So. 2d at 64.
329. 706 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
330. Id. at 398.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
334. Id. at 588.
335. Id. at 587.
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on unobjected-to closing argument, the last time it did so in a civil case was
in 1956."336
The court provided an extensive overview of Florida case law relating
to the issue. It stated that "we do not think improper, but unobjected-to,
closing argument in a civil case is something so fundamental that there
should be an exception to the rule requiring an objection."3  The court
further stated that "we do not think we are being inconsistent with our
supreme court when we all but close the door on allowing this issue to be
raised for the first time on appeal.
338
XX. ORAL ARGUMENT
In Whitehead v. Dreyer,339 counsel for one of the appellees was denied
the opportunity to present oral argument on behalf of his client.340 Prior to a
decision by the court, that attorney filed a motion for rehearing, contending
that he was entitled to participate in oral argument because he filed a brief as
an appellee.
341
The fifth district recognized that "[a]lthough Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.020 defines an appellee as every party other than the appellant,
the committee notes to that rule observe the term appellee 'has been defined
to include the parties against whom relief is sought and all others necessary
to the cause."' 342 Pointing out that relief was not being sought against the
appellee represented by the attorney who moved for rehearing and that the
appellee was not a necessary party to the appealed judgment, the court
denied the motion.343
XXI. SANCTIONS
344
In Mercade v. State, the second district concluded that a pro se,
incarcerated appellant had brought a frivolous appeal from a trial court order
denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence.345 The court consequently
336. Id. at 589 (citing Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Strickland, 88 So. 2d519 (Fla. 1956)).
337. Id.
338. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 590.
339. 698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
340. Id. at 1280.
341. Id.
342. Id. (citing 1973 Amendments to Committee Notes, FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(g)).
343. Id.
344. 698 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
345. Id. at 1313.
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recommended that the Department of Corrections exercise its discretion to
subject the appellant to the forfeiture of gain time in accord with section
944.28 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).346
The court stated:
We use this case.. .to send a message to prisoners collaterally
attacking sentences imposed by the trial courts of this district that
we fully intend to invoke the applicable provisions of section
944.28, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), governing the forfeiture of
gain time and the right to earn gain time in the future, when we are
confronted with a frivolous appeal, such as this one, from the
denial of a motion for postconviction relief.347
The court went on to discuss the statute to which it had referred. It
noted that effective July 1, 1996, section 944.28(2)(a) was amended in part
to provide that "'[a]ll or any part of the gain time earned by a prisoner
according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner...
is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding
or appeal in any court."' 348 It also pointed out that the legislature in section
944.28 (2)(c) "vested sole discretion in the Department of Corrections to
declare a forfeiture of a prisoner's gain time for any violation of section
944.28(2)(a), including the bringing of a frivolous appeal. 349
The court went on to state:
It is manifestly clear to us that by amending section 944.28(2)(a),
the Florida Legislature sent a definite message to prisoners such as
the appellant that the initiation of frivolous legal proceedings
before the courts of this state, including the bringing of frivolous
appeals, will no longer be tolerated as a matter of public policy and
that the consequence of bringing such proceedings may result in the
Department of Corrections imposing the harshest of sanctions
available to punish a prisoner-a longer period of incarceration
through the forfeiture of gain time. We fully intend to implement
this legislative policy expression.
350
The court also noted that it was not the first appellate court "to rely on
the provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) in an attempt to stem the flow of
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1314.
348. FLA. STAT. § 944.28(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
349. Mercade, 698 So. 2d at 1315.
350. Id.
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frivolous post-conviction appeals,35 citing to three fifth district cases, two
of which provided a warning to defendants that further pursuit of frivolous
appeals would subject them to sanctions as provided in 944.28(2)(a),35 2 and
one of which353 "direct[ed] the Department of Corrections to forfeit the
applicable gain time" of one of the individuals who had been previously
warned.354
The Mercade court stated that "[a]lthough we share the same
frustrations over frivolous post-conviction appeals as do our colleagues on
the Fifth District, we conclude that we do not have the authority to simply
direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit a prisoner's gain time after
finding that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous." The court therefore
declined to follow the "'direct' approach" taken by the fifth district.3  The
court then stated:
We express our confidence, however, that if we consistently
implement the legislative policy expressed in section 944.28(2)(a)
in the manner we have done in this case, and if the Department of
Corrections consistently invokes the procedures of section
944.28(2)(c) when notified that a particular prisoner has brought a
frivolous appeal before us, then prisoners will be dissuaded from
bringing frivolous postconviction appeals because of the looming
specter of the loss of a prisoner's most precious commodity-gain
time.357
XXII. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Certiorari
In North Beach Association of St. Lucie County, Inc. v. St. Lucie
County,358 a landowner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit
court to challenge a rezoning order.359 After the landowner amended the
351. Id. at 1316.
352. Ferenc v. State, 697 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hall v. State, 690
So. 2d 754 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
353. Hall v. State, 698 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
354. Id.
355. Mercade, 698 So. 2d at 1316.
356. L
357. Id.
358. 706 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
359. Id. at 63.
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petition to allege additional grounds, the circuit court dismissed the petition,
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the substantive arguments
in the amended petition.36°
Reviewing the dismissal, the fourth district granted certiorari, stating
that "[a] petition for certiorari may be amended to include additional
substantive arguments when the interests of justice are served thereby. 36'
The court noted that it is "not entirely uncommon" for appellants to move to
file amended briefs to raise additional issues and that the court grants such
motions when appellants gave satisfactory explanations as to why they did
not raise the issues in their initial briefs and when there is no prejudice to
opposing parties.362 "We see no reason not to extend the same reasoning to
the amendment of petitions for extraordinary relief," the court stated.
363
District court decisions involving requests for certiorari included Patton
v. State,3 4 (certiorari proper method of seeking review of order committing
criminal defendant to custody of Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services after a determination that he was incompetent to proceed);
Taxpayers Ass'n. of Indian River County, Inc. v. Indian River County,365
(certiorari granted by district court when circuit court improperly concluded
that petition for certiorari filed in circuit court to review action of county
commission was moot); Larkin v. Pirthauer,366 (order disqualifying attorney
from representing personal representative of an estate reviewable b
certiorari); Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom,%
(certiorari proper to review law firm's motion to withdraw as counsel);
Board of County Commissioners v. Brabham, 36 (certiorari is appropriate
method of reviewing order which awards counsel fees to court-appointed
attorneys in criminal cases); Lerner v. Lerner,369 (certiorari granted to quash
order granting a motion to compel the listing of a marital home for
immediate sale); Rutherford, Mulhall & Wargo, P.A. v. Antidormi,37°
(certiorari granted to quash order requiring law firm, that had imposed a
restraining lien on its office file for a former client who disputed the fee
charged, to turn the file over to the client before the fee was paid); Okaloosa
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. North Beach Ass'n of St. Lucie County, 706 So. 2d at 63.
364. 712 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
365. 701 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
366. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
367. 701 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
368. 710 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
369. 708 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
370. 695 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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County v. Custer,371 (certiorari appropriate to review denial of motion to
dismiss complaint for failure to comply with medical malpractice presuit
requirements); Gunning v. Brophy,372 (certiorari granted to vacate an order
compelling a petitioner to respond to interrogatories that was entered after a
notice was filed removing the case to federal court); Code Enforcement
Board v. Bustamont,373 (appellate decision of circuit court quashed on
petition for writ of certiorari when circuit court had reversed a decision on
an appeal which was untimely and as to which the appellant had waived not
only the grounds of but the right to appeal in the first place); Leveritt &
Associates, P.A. v. Williamson,374 (certiorari granted to quash circuit court's
affirmance of trial court's final judgment when circuit court refused to
review issue of whether the trial court erred in denying motion to disqualify
trial court); and, WFTV, Inc. v. Hinn, 375 (certiorari granted to quash order
denying motion to strike a punitive damages claim).
B. Prohibition
In Valitos v. State,376 a criminal defendant sought prohibition after a
trial judge denied a motion for disqualification based on the fact that the
judge, in acceding to a request to order a presentence report on the propriety
of youthful offender sanctions, announced that doing so would be a "'waste
of the Court's time.' 3 77 A response to the petition, filed by the Attorney
General on behalf of the trial judge, stated that the "'trial court merely
indicated she did not think it would be appropriate to sentence petitioner as a
youthful offender, but she nonetheless would consider sentencing petitioner
as such. ' '3 78 The response concluded that there "'has been no showing that
petitioner would not receive a fair hearing and sentence before this
judge.' , 37 9
The second district noted that in reviewing motions for disqualification,
trial judges may look only at the facial sufficiency of the motions and that
attempts to refute charges of partiality exceed the scope of the inquiry and
establish grounds for disqualification. 38 The court further stated that "[t]his
371. 697 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. lst Dist. CL App. 1997).
372. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2167 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
373. 706 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
374. 698 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
375. 705 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998).
376. 707 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
377. Id. at 344.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
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principle applies with equal force to a response filed in a prohibition
proceeding in the appellate court by the trial judge whose partiality is
questioned, and the response refutes factual allegations or conclusions., 38'
Based on these principles, the court found that "[t]he response filed on
behalf of the trial judge in this proceeding creat[ed] 'an intolerable adversary
atmosphere between the trial judge and the litigant"' and consequently
382granted prohibition.
C. Effects on Appeals of Prior Denials of Petitions for Writs of Prohibition
In Sumner v. Sumner,383 the second district declined to follow the lead
of the third and fourth districts, holding that denials of petitions for writs of
prohibition will not bar subsequent, post-trial review unless the order of
denial states that it is with prejudice or otherwise evinces an unequivocal
384determination by the court that the merits were considered. The court's
conclusion was consistent with its historical approach to the issue, an
approach that was rejected by the third district in Obanion v. State.385 In
Obanion, the court determined that petitions which are denied without
comment will be deemed to constitute determinations on the merits, barring
the issues raised from being litigated on subsequent appeals. 386 The fourth
district adopted the Obanion approach in Hobbs v. State.387 In Barwick v.
388State, the supreme court approved of the use by the third and fourth
districts of the Obanion approach, but declined to adopt it for itself,
concluding instead that petitions filed in the supreme court would preclude
subsequent review only when the order denying the petition specifically
stated that the denial was with prejudice. 389
D. Mandamus
In Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission,390 an inmate appealed from a
circuit court order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus to review an
381. Valltos, 707 So. 2d at 344.
382. Id. at 345.
383. 707 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
384. Id. at 934.
385. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
386. Id. at 980.
387. 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
388. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995).
389. Id. at 691.
390. 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (criminal division en banc).
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order suspending his presumptive parole release date.391 The first district
acknowledged that "final judgment on a complaint for writ of mandamus is
reviewable by appeal," but concluded that this principle did not apply to the
case under review because the circuit court petition was filed "as an
appellate remedy to review quasi-judicial action of a lower tribunal. 392
Under such circumstances, the court concluded, circuit court orders denying
mandamus are "reviewable in the district court by certiorari under rule
9.030(b)(2)(B), and not by a subsequent plenary appeal on the merits of the
case."
3 93
In Orange County v. Love,394 a criminal defendant was acquitted of the
charges brought against her in county court.395 Subsequently, that court
certified some, but not all, of the defendant's claimed costs. 396 She then filed
a petition for mandamus in the circuit court to compel certification of all
claimed CoStS.397 At the hearing on the petition, the county, which was
responsible for reimbursing the costs allowed, appeared and objected to a
majority of the costs. 398 The circuit court granted the petition, finding that
the county court should certify all costs incurred by the defendant, except
those which she conceded were not reimbursable, and the county
appealed. 399 The fifth district noted that the county was never a proper party
to either the criminal case or the mandamus and that there was no order
requiring the county to pay the costs. 4° Accordingly, the court found that
the county lacked standing to bring the appeal.401
E. Habeas Corpus
In McCray v. State,4°2 a criminal defendant, who had received a death
penalty that was reduced on appeal to life imprisonment without parole for
twenty-five years, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
391. Id. at 1204.
392. Id. at 1204-05.
393. Id. at 1205.
394. 703 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
395. Id. at 1139.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Love, 703 So. 2d at 1139.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 699 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1997).
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effectiveness of his appellate counsel.4°3 The petition was filed fifteen years
after the original appeal. 4 4 4
The court found the petition to be barred by laches.4°5 Noting that
"[t]he unwarranted filings of such delayed claims unnecessarily clog the
,406court dockets and represent an abuse of the judicial process," the court
stated:
To remedy this abuse, we conclude, as a matter of law, that any
petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel is presumed to be the result of an unreasonable
delay and to prejudice the state if the petition has been filed more
than five years from the date the petitioner's conviction became
final. We further conclude that this initial presumption may be
overcome only if the petitioner alleges under oath, with a specific
factual basis, that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the
results of the appeal by counsel.
4 °7
In Lewis v. Florida Parole Commission,408 the appellant filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the tenth circuit in Polk County, where he was
incarcerated, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the
revocation of his parole.40 9 On motion of the parole commission, the court
transferred the case to the second circuit on the theory that the commission is
located in Leon County, within that circuit.410 That court dismissed the
petition as an abuse of the writ based on the conclusion that the appellant
had filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the second circuit challenging
his presumptive parole release date and could and should have raised the
issues from the habeas corpus petition in the mandamus action.4 '
403. Id. at 1366.
404. Id. at 1367. The petition was not barred by the two-year limitation period under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(3)(B) for petitions alleging ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel because Rule 9.140(j)(3)(C) provides that the two-year period "shall not begin
to run prior to the effective date of this rule" and the petition at issue was filed within two years of
the effective date.
405. Id. at 1386.
406. Id.
407. McCray, 699 So. 2d at 1368 (Fla. 1997).
408. 697 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
409. Id. at 965.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 965-66.
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412On appeal, the first district reversed, holding that the second circuit
"did not have territorial jurisdiction to rule on such petitioning' 413 because
"a habeas petition challenging a parole revocation must be filed in the
county where the prisoner is incarcerated. 414 The court went on to state that
"[o]n the other hand, the proper method of challenging a presumptive parole
release date is by a petition for writ of mandamus, filed in the Circuit Court
of Leon County. '4 1 Simply put, the court found that the appellant had
instituted each of his two proceedings in the proper court.
The court rejected the Parole Commission's argument that the issue of
venue was moot because the appellant did not appeal the change of venue to
the second district, where Polk County is located.416 The court found that
even if it were to accept that argument, the order under review would still
have to be reversed because the circuit court in Leon County lacked
"territorial jurisdiction' 417 over the action. The court also declined the
Parole Commission's request to "engage in a harmless-error analysis
41 8
because "[a]s this is a matter for the courts of another district, we believe it
would be improper for this court to in any way comment on the
meritoriousness of appellant's claim., 41 9 Finally, the court also rejected the
Parole Commission's "fallback position" that the matter be remanded with
instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice to refile in the
appropriate court. 420 The court felt that such a result would be "unjust and
inappropriate" since the appellant had "already filed the matter in the proper
court, and the Parole Commission improperly moved to change venue."'421
The court therefore remanded with instructions to transfer the petition back
422to the tenth circuit.
Venue was also at issue in Calloway v. State.423 There, a defendant
appealed from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus that had been filed
412. Id. at 965.
413. Lewis, 697 So. 2d at 965.
414. Id. at966.
415. Id. (citing Porter v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 603 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Lewis, 697 So. 2d at 966.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 699 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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424in Dade County, which constitutes the eleventh circuit. The defendant had
been convicted in the seventeenth circuit and could no longer file a timely
motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 in that circuit.425 He admitted that he filed his petition in
Dade County in an attempt to avoid the limitations period of rule 3.850.426
The third district dismissed the appeal on two grounds. First, the court
stated that "[a] petition for habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the
two-year period for filing motions for post-conviction relief.' 427 The court
then went on to say, "[a] more significant reason for our dismissal of this
appeal, however, is that the trial court in Dade County was without
jurisdiction to entertain defendant's petition. '[A] circuit court has no
jurisdiction to review the legality of a conviction in another circuit .... ,,428
The fifth district relied on Calloway in dismissing an appeal from the
429denial of a habeas corpus petition in McLeroy v. State. In that case, the
petitioner, who had been convicted in the eleventh circuit, filed his petition
in the fifth circuit, where he was incarcerated.43° The fifth district pointed
out that "[g]enerally, a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be filed in
the jurisdiction where the petitioner is incarcerated., 431 The court went on to
state, however, that "petitions for writ[s] of habeas corpus which allege
ineffective assistance of counsel are properly filed in the court where the
original sentence was imposed.,
432
F. Coram Nobis
In Peart v. State,433 the third district receded from Beckles v. State,434
and held that coram nobis is not an available remedy to defendants who were
not advised of the deportation consequences of their pleas in criminal
424. Id. at 849,
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. (citing Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 470 (Fla. 1992); Leichtman v.
Singletary, 674 So. 2d 889, 891-92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. (1996)).
428. Calloway, 699 So. 2d at 849-50 (quoting State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
429. 704 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
430. Id. at 152.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. 705 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en bane).
434. 679 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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cases.435 The court pointed out that the function of a writ of coram nobis is
to correct errors of fact, and that the failure to advise of deportation
consequences is an error of law. 6 The court therefore concluded that the
proper remedy for defendants to pursue is post-conviction relief pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
The court recognized that because defendants who are not in custody
cannot seek post conviction relief under the rule, such relief is "never
available" to defendants who are released on "time served," without any
period of probation or community control.438 The court recognized that "this
may be a harsh and unfair result" as to such defendants.439 "However," the
court continued, "there is no present mechanism that provides relief under
these circumstances, and it is beyond this Court's authority to alter the
procedural rules to provide this relief."440 The court went to suggest that the
supreme court "consider whether a rule should be adopted to address the
issue."441 The court also certified that its decision conflicted with the
decisions in Marriott v. State442 and Wood v. State.443
XXIII. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Trial Court Jurisdiction During Pendency of Appeal
In Daniels v. State,444 a defendant who had a pending appeal from an
order revoking community control filed a motion for post conviction relief in
the trial court.445 The motion was denied and the first district affirmed,
despite finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post
conviction motion during the pendency of the appeal.446 The Supreme Court
of Florida quashed the district court's decision and remanded with directions
that the trial court's order on the motion be vacated.447 The court stated:
435. Peart, 705 So. 2d at 1062.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1063.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Peart, 705 So. 2d at 1063.
442. 605 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
443. 698 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
444. 712 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1998).
445. Id. at 765.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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[D]uring the pendency of a defendant's direct appeal, the trial court
is without jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief.
Consistent with Meneses and Hall, we hold that a ruling on the
merits of the postconviction motion rendered by the trial court is a
nullity, and, consequently, a decision by the appellate court that
affirms or reverses the trial court's ruling is also a nullity.448
The fourth district, in Griner v. State,449 also addressed the impact of a
pending appeal on the trial court's jurisdiction to consider a motion for post
conviction relief.450 There, a defendant sought such relief with regard to
convictions for certain charges while an appeal was pending from
convictions on other charges that had been included in the same information,
but had been severed for trial.45' Noting that the State cited no authority in
support of its argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate
court found that the defendant had "clear legal right to a ruling on his motion
for post conviction relief.
452
B. Flight
The State moved to dismiss a defendant's appeal in Griffis v. State453 on
the ground that the defendant had absconded after jury selection, was tried
and convicted in absentia and was not returned to custody for six years, at
454which time he was adjudicated and sentenced. Relying on State v.
Gurican,455 the State asserted that the defendant's flight constituted a waiver
of the right to appellate review.456  Finding the case to be "materially
indistinguishable" from Gurican, the first district granted the State's
•457
motion. The court noted, however, the defendant's argument that many of
the policy considerations underlying the decision in Gurican were
subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Ortega-
Rodriguez v. United States.458 The court recognized that the decision in
448. Daniels, 712 So. 2d at 765 (citing State v. Meneses, 392 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1981); Hall
v. State, 697 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1997)).
449. 705 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
450. Id. at 650.
451. Id.
452. Id. (citing Moore v. Kaplan, 640 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
453. 703 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
454. Id. at 523.
455. 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991).
456. Griffis, 703 So. 2d at 523.
457. Id.
458. 507 U.S. 234 (1993).
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Ortega-Rodriguez was based on the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory powers over the federal courts as opposed to any federal
constitutional principle, and that the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v.
Troupe,4 9 had declined to follow Ortega-Rodriguez, adhering instead to an
approach consistent with Gurican. 4 W Nonetheless, the court certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether Gurican should be re-
evaluated in light of Ortega-Rodriguez.461
C. Appeals After Pleas of Guilty or Nolo Contendere
The defendant in Harriel v. State462 pled guilty and was sentenced
pursuant to a negotiated plea.463 After his appointed counsel filed a notice of
appeal, a State motion to dismiss the appeal was denied without prejudice.4&
The Public Defender handling the appeal then filed a brief pursuant to the
dictates of Anders v. California,465 which allows court appointed counsel to
satisfy their ethical obligations when they can identify no meritorious issues
466to raise on appeal. In reconsidering and granting the State's motion to
dismiss, the court wrote an opinion "to establish a procedure for reviewing
motions to dismiss appeals from convictions and sentences based on
voluntary pleas of guilty or nolo contendere without reservation" of the right
to appeal a dispositive issue.
467
The court pointed out that under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure,
9.140(b)(2)(B) which incorporates the dictates of Robinson v. State, 68
defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere without reservation may
appeal only:
(i) the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
(ii) a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea;
459. 891 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1995).
460. Griffis, 703 So. 2d at 523 n.1.
461. Id. at 523.
462. 710 So. 2d 102 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
463. Id. at 102-03.
464. Id. at 103.
465. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
466. Hardel, 710 So. 2d at 103.
467. Id.
468. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979).
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(iii) an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw
plea;
(iv) a sentencing error, if preserved; or
(v) as otherwise provided by law.4 6
9
Given this fact, the court stated:
[W]e hold that the state may move to dismiss an appeal from a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere without reservation, on the basis that
the issues identified in Robinson are not implicated, with sufficient
references to the record to support its position, and the appellant
may file a response. We can then review the record to determine
whether the appellant made a motion to withdraw the plea to
preserve the issues of voluntariness of the plea and violation of the
plea agreement or filed a motion to correct a sentencing error. If
no motions have been filed, we will determine whether the other
Robinson issues of subject matter jurisdiction or illegality of
sentence exist. If they do not, we will dismiss the appeal as
frivolous. If they do, we will deny the motion to dismiss, and the
appellant can file a brief, Anders or otherwise.
470
The court added that if the state does not move to dismiss appeals from
guilty or nolo contendere pleas, it will still examine the record and brief to
determine whether a properly preserved Robinson issue exists.471 If no such
472issue exists, the court will summarily affirm. If one does, it will "treat the
issue as in any other comparable appeal. 473
In Vaughn v. State,474 the defendant pled nolo contendere and reserved
the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which the trial court
had found to be dispositive. 475  The trial court's determination as to
dispositiveness was based on its belief that the state would not have been
able to convince the jury of the defendant's guilt without the evidence that
476
was the subject of the suppression motion.
469. Harriel, 710 So. 2d at 104 (citing FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(B)).
470. Id. at 106.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. 711 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
475. Id. at 64.
476. Id. at 65.
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The first district court noted that it had previously held on several
occasions that issues are dispositive only if there will be no trial of the case
regardless of the result of the appeal.477 The court therefore concluded that
the trial court had applied an incorrect legal rule in finding the issue to be
dispositive.478 Since, under the facts of the case, there existed ample
evidence, independent of that to which the motion was directed, for the State
to proceed to trial, the court found that the issue was not dispositive and
dismissed the appeal.479
D. Appellate Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence
In Barton v. State,480 the first district agreed with a defendant that
certain evidence was improperly admitted at trial.481 The court went on to
review the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim and, in doing so,
faced the question of whether it could consider the improperly admitted
evidence in deciding the sufficiency issue.482 "It does not follow," the court
found, "that the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal merely
because evidence that is critical to the court's finding of sufficiency was
,48341improperly admitted." Relying on the decision in Lockhart v. Nelson,484
the court pointed out that some procedural errors might be corrected on
- . • 485 c
remand, thereby allowing the evidence to be used again. "Consequently,"
the court concluded, "the appellate courts must consider the sufficiency of
the evidence and alleged trial errors separately. 486
E. Reviewable Orders
Numerous cases passed on the question of whether particular orders in
criminal cases were reviewable by appellate courts. These cases included:
State v. Allen,487 (state may appeal from order partially denying claim for
477. Id.
478. Id. at 66.
479. Vaugln, 711 So. 2d at 66.
480. 704 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
481. Id. at 573.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
485. Barton, 704 So. 2d at 573 (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)).
486. Id.
487. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1997).
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restitution); Downs v. State,488 (defendant mal appeal from order designating
him a sexual predator); Thomas v. State, (same); Torres v. State,4
(defendant cannot appeal from order denying motion for violation of
probation hearing, proper procedure is to seek a habeas corpus in the circuit
491of incarceration); Oser v. State, (defendant cannot appeal from order
denying motion to mitigate); Brown v. State,492 (defendant cannot appeal
from order denying motion to mitigate, but when circuit court's denial was
based on an erroneous determination that the defendant's motion was
untimely, court treated appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, granted
petition, and remanded for proper consideration of the motion).
F. Belated Appeals
In Trowell v. State,493 the first district examined the trial court's denial
of a defendant's motion for a belated appeal,494 citing Thomas v. State495 and
concluding that the defendant was not entitled to an appeal because he had
entered a negotiated plea of guilty and waived his right to appeal matters
relating to the judgment.496
The appellate court noted that Thomas was inconsistent with a
substantial body of case law from the first district as well as other district
courts.497 Thus, the court receded from Thomas to the extent that the
decision in that case required defendants seeking belated appeals to state
what issues they would have raised on appeal, whether or how those issues
would have been dispositive, or how they were otherwise prejudiced. 498 The
court went on to state:
[T]here should be no difference between a defendant's right to a
belated appeal, if the evidence discloses that the delay was not
attributable to his or her own neglect, and the right to a timely
appeal, insofar as any requirement that the defendant make a
preliminary showing of merit. In both cases, a statement of
488. 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
489. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2541 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997).
490. 700 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
491. 699 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
492. 707 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
493. 706 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
494. Id. at 333.
495. 626 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
496. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 333.
497. Id. (citations omitted).
498. Id.
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meritorious issues is irrelevant to one's entitlement to appeal.
Similarly, there should be no difference between a defendant's
right to a belated appeal from a conviction following trial or after a
plea, because, in either instance, if the appeal had been timely filed,
an initial statement of arguable points would be irrelevant to the
right to appeal.499
Thus, the court said:
[W]e are of the firm belief that the only relevant inquiry, once a
request for a belated appeal is made, is whether the defendant was
informed of his or her right to an appeal and thereafter timely made
a request for an appeal to his or her attorney or other appropriate
person. If the appeal proceeds from the entry of an unconditional
guilty or nolo contendere plea, it may, due to appellant's failure to
submit any issue cognizable under Robinson [v. State] ,50
eventually result in dismissal by an appellate court, but issues of
merit are not required as a precondition to the appeali
01
Recognizing that subsequent to the trial court's ruling, Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.1400)(1) was amended to provide that petitions
seeking belated appeals are to be filed in the appellate courts, the court
construed the motion in the case as a properly filed petition and granted it.
502
The court noted that its decision conflicted with several decisions from other
district courts50 3 and certified the conflict.5°4
In Denson v. State,505 the fifth district discussed how to deal with
50factual questions relating to requests for belated appeals. 06 The petitioner
there sought a belated appeal and the State, despite not specifically disputing
the petitioner's allegations, argued that in the absence of a sworn affidavit
from trial counsel or supporting documentation, neither of which had been
499. Id. at 334-35.
500. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979). For a discussion of the issues that can be raised
under Robinson after a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, see Section XXIII (C) of this article.
501. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 337 (citing Baggett v. Wainwright 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
1969); Amendments to the Florida Rule ofAppellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1996)).
502. Trowell, 706 So.2d at 338.
503. Gonzalez v. State, 685 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Loadholt v. State,
683 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Zduniak v. State, 620 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Bridges v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
504. Trowell, 706 So. 2d at 338.
505. 710 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
506. Id.
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provided, an evidentiary hearing should be required.50 7 The court disagreed,
noting that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j), which governs
belated appeals, does not require a petitioner to provide an affidavit from
trial counsel and stated that, "[i]nstead, the state must dispute the petitioner's
sworn claim, if not by affidavit, at least by specific allegations."10 Where
there is an absence of disputed fact, the court stated, "the petition will be
granted without an evidentiary hearing." 50 9
G. Appeals By the State
In State v. Rincon,510 as authorized by section 924.07(1)(j) of the
Florida Statutes,51 the State appealed from a judgment of acquittal entered
after the jury had returned a guilty verdict.5 12 The defendant asserted that
notwithstanding the statutory authority, the appeal ran afoul of double
jeopardy. 513 The court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that
"double jeopardy is a consideration only when a retrial of the defendant
would be necessitated by a reversal of the trial court's ruling."514 Since
reversal in the case under review would result not in a retrial, but in the
reinstatement of the jury verdict, the court considered the merits of the
515case.
H. Cross-Appeals
In Hudson v. State,516 a defendant appealed from convictions for
trafficking in and conspiracy to traffic in 200 or more, but less than 400,
grams of cocaine. 517 The State, on cross-appeal, asserted that the trial court
erred in granting a motion for judgment of acquittal as to charges that the
defendant was guilty of offenses involving 400 or more grams of cocaine.
5 18
507. Id.
508. Id. at 145.
509. Id.
510. 700 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
511. Id.
512. Id. at 412.
513. Id. at414.
514. Id. (quoting Ramos v. State, 457 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(emphasis added by the court)).
515. Rincon, 700 So. 2d at 413.
516. 711 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
517. Id. at 245.
518. Id.
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The first district examined section 924.07 of the Florida Statutes, which
confers on the state the right to appeal certain orders in criminal cases.
519
First, the court looked to section 924.07(1)0),520 which allows the state to
appeal from a "ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury
verdict. 521 Reading this provision in the context of the double jeopardy
clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the court found that "this
statutory provision plainly contemplates appeal from a judgment of acquittal
only if the judgment of acquittal follows a guilty verdict. 5 22
The court went on to consider section 924.07(1)(d), which authorizes
state appeals from rulings on questions of law when defendants are
convicted and appeal from the judgment.5 3 The court determined that "[i]n
keeping with precedent" and with the rule of statutory construction that
specific statutes control over general ones on the same subject,524 it would
"decline to construe the general language of subsection (1)(d) as overriding
the specific provision in subsection (1)(j).,, 525 The state's cross-appeal was
therefore dismissed. 26
In State v. Fedor,527 the State appealed from an order excluding certain
evidence and the defendant filed a cross-appeal directed to another portion
of the order appealed from.52 Subsequently, the State voluntarily dismissed
its appeal and the fifth district faced the issue of whether it had jurisdiction
to hear the cross-appeal. 29
The court noted that a cross-appeal can continue after a main appeal is
dismissed "if the cross-appeal could have been appealed on its own merits,
independent of the [sic] main appeal. 5 30 Since a criminal defendant has no
independent right to appeal a pretrial order, but can do so only by cross-
appeal to review a related issue which was resolved in the same order that
the state is appealing, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and
531dismissed the case.
519. Id. at 246; see FLA. STAT. § 924.07 (1995).
520. Id.
521. Hudson, 711 So. 2d at 246 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)G) (1995)).
522. Id.
523. Id. at 247.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Hudson, 711 So. 2d at 247.
527. 714 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
528. Id. at 526.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 526-27.
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I. Public Defenders
The Supreme Court of Florida, in In re Public Defender's Certification
of Conflict,532 approved an order of the second district which addressed the
large number of criminal appeals involving indigent defendants represented
by the Public Defender's Office for the tenth circuit who were "not receiving
timely appellate review. 533  The second district's order had been
precipitated by a motion from the Public Defender to withdraw in 248 cases
"due to what the Public Defender deemed to be 'an excessive caseload."'
534
The order indicated that the second district was reviewing cases in which the
defendants had served their prison sentences or had completed their
probation before the Public Defender filed its briefs with the court. 35 At
oral argument, the supreme court was advised that the number of cases then
536delinquent exceeded 640. The order required the Public Defender to
accept no appellate cases until further order and mandated that the chief
judges of the circuits within the district "appoint qualified attorneys to
represent indigents in appeals arising in their respective circuits.
5 37
The order acknowledged that it was placing an enormous financial
burden on the counties, but explained that without such a drastic step, the
court would be unable to fulfill its "constitutional duty to provide
meaningful review to indigent criminal defendants. 538  In approving the
order, the supreme court stated:
The facts in this record establish a significant problem of
constitutional magnitude that must immediately be addressed. We
do not want to face a situation where a significant number of
defendants convicted of felony offenses must be released on bond
because their appeals of right are not being timely addressed due to
the lack of counsel required to be provided under the United States
Constitution. We must provide an immediate short-term solution
to this crisis.
539
532. 709 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1998).
533. Id. at 102.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Public Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d at 102.
538. Id. at 103.
539. Id.
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The supreme court additionally required the chief judge of the second
district, the Public Defender, and the Attorney General to provide status
reports on September 1, 1998, (about five months after the date of the
opinion) "as to whether the order should be continued, modified, or
terminated," and requested that the legislature consider providing an
emergency fund to help the affected counties.540 In concluding, the court
said:
We strongly believe that there needs to be a long-term as well as
a short-term solution, and, in this regard, we would encourage the
creation of a special committee or commission by the legislature to
examine the structure and funding of indigent representation in
criminal cases. We firmly believe that this type of delay in the
criminal justice process, as illustrated in this case, can be
eliminated by a joint effort of all interested parties. This Court is
very willing to participate and provide necessary resource
assistance to develop a viable solution to this ongoing problem.54
In a specially concurring opinion that was joined in by Justice Wells,
Justice Overton suggested "that the time has come to reevaluate the structure
of how we provide Public Defender representation." 542 He set forth some
proposed structural changes: the elimination of the five district appellate
offices and the representation by each Public Defender's office of the
defendants from its jurisdiction, the creation within each Public Defender's
office of a separate section for conflict cases for both trial and appeal, and
that these conflict sections be funded to handle the capital collateral
representation of defendants sentenced to death in other circuits. 5 43 Justice
Overton ended his opinion by stating:
In conclusion, these structural changes should provide better
representation for indigent defendants, assist in alleviating
problems counties are facing in paying for the cost of conflict
counsel, provide a unified administrative structure for funding, and
provide more effective administration of collateral representation
in capital cases. With the implementation of such changes, the
legislature should be better able to focus on other problems
540. Id. at 104.
541. Id.
542. Public Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d at 104 (Overton, J.,
concurring specially).
543. Id. at 105.
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confronting the effective administration of our criminal justice
system.
544
XXIV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASE
In State v. T.M.B.,545 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed several
cases in which the respondents pled either guilty or nolo contendere in
juvenile delinquency proceedings and attempted to appeal the final orders of
delinquency. The State had opposed the appeals, arguing that the
respondents were required by sections 924.051(3) and (4) of the Florida
Statutes, to preserve their claims for review. 547 The first district rejected the
state's argument, concluding that section 924.051 applies only to criminal
cases, not juvenile matters, 548 but certified the issue to the supreme court.5 4 9
In approving the district court's conclusion, the supreme court found that
because "the terms and conditions of juvenile appeals are addressed
exhaustively in chapter 39 [of the Florida Statutes] ... [i]t is ... clear that
the legislature intended chapter 39 to govern juvenile apeals ... [and] that
section 924.051 is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings."
551In A.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, the fourth
district examined the issue of whether an order adjudicating a child
dependent is a final appealable order or whether it is a non-final order that
can be reviewed in a subsequent appeal from a later disposition order.
552
The court concluded that such orders are final and certified conflict with the
fifth district's decision in Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services.
553
544. Id.
545. 716 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1998).
546. Id. at 269.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 270.
549. Id. at 269.
550. T.M.B., 716 So. 2d at 271.
551. 707 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
552. Id. at 972.
553. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The court noted that both Moore
and G.L.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997),
which the first district certified as conflicting with Moore, dealt with termination of parental
rights. "[W]e view the issue of appealability, vel non, of an adjudicatory order to be the same in
dependency proceedings," the court said. A.G., 707 So. 2d at 972. For a discussion of the
decision in G.LS., see supra Part XXV. at 96.
[Vol. 23:1
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In Department of Juvenile Justice v. J.R.,554 the Department of Juvenile
Justice ("DJJ") appealed from an order adjudicating "a juvenile as a
delinquent and committing him to a specific treatment program., 55 5 The
juvenile moved to strike DJJ's notice of appeal and brief, which argued that
the trial court exceeded its authority by specifying the detention program
placement. 6 The juvenile pointed to the fact that section 985.234(1)(b) of
the Florida Statutes (1997), provides that in appeals by the state, the State
Attorney is to file the notice of appeal and the fact that other provisions of
chapter 985 call for the State Attorney to represent the state in the trial court
and for the Attorney General to do so on appeal.557 The Attorney General
also appeared and took the position that the juvenile's motions should be
granted. 58
The first district disagreed, noting that "[s]ection 985.23(1)(d) provides
that parties to the case shall include representatives of DJJ" and found that
DJJ was "not the prosecuting authority (i.e., 'the state'), but rather
appear[ed] in its capacity as the legal custodian of the child committed to its
care. 559 The court determined that "the right DJJ seeks to vindicate on
appeal is unique to its role as the custodian charged with the care of a
delinquent child," and denied the juvenile's motions. 60
In E.P.H. v. Wright,561 the fourth district found that habeas corpus is the
proper method for reviewing orders of secure detention. 562  The court
recognized that section 985.215(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes, states that such
orders shall be deemed final orders reviewable by appeal, but agreed with
the first district in T.L.W v. Soud563 that "this statute is unconstitutional as a
legislative attempt to provide for appeal of non-final orders." 564  Judge
Farmer dissented, expressing the belief that the legislature's power to
establish substantive rights includes "the power to say when a right is so
important that the judicial determination of it is final for purposes of
554. 710 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
555. Id. at 212.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 213.
559. Department of Juvenile Justice, 710 So. 2d at 213.
560. Id. at 214.
561. 708 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
562. Id. at 674.
563. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
564. E.P.A., 708 So. 2d at 674 (citing T.L.W. v. Soud, 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
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appellate review" and indicating that he "would certify conflict with
T.L. W ,
565
XXV. APPEALS FROM ORDERS TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children and Families,566 a father appealed
from two orders, an order terminating his parental rights, and a disposition
order committing the minor children to the legal care, custody, and control of
567the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The order
terminating parental rights was entered eighteen days before the disposition
order, and the notice of appeal was filed twenty-four days after the
568disposition order. Thus, although the notice was timely as to the
disposition order,569 the first district was faced with the issue of whether the
notice was timely with regard to the termination order.
The father argued only the disposition order was a final order and that
had he filed a notice of appeal from the termination order, it would have
been premature and thus "held in abeyance until the entry of the final
disposition order., 570  The court disagreed, holding that "an adjudication
order in which parental rights are actually terminated is a final, appealable
order, subject to immediate review." 571 Because the notice of appeal was not
timely as regards to the termination order, the appeal was dismissed. 572 The
court noted that its dismissal was without prejudice to the father's right to
seek a belated appeal573 and certified that the decision was in conflict 574 with
two fifth district cases.
575
565. 708 So. 2d at 674.
566. 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
567. Id. at 97.
568. Id.
569. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), a notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days of rendition of the order from which review is sought. FLA. R. APP. P.
9.11 O(b).
570. G.LS., 700 So. 2d at 98.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 99.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Lewis v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 664 So. 2d
1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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XXVI. ATTORNEYS' FEES
576In Berry v. Scotty's, Inc., an appellant requested attorney's fees after
prevailing in an appeal from an order of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission.577 The second district noted that when statutes provide for
awards of appellate attorneys' fees, and the lower tribunals are circuit or
county courts, the court grants entitlement to an award of fees and remands
for the trial court to determine the amount of the award.578 The court noted,
however, that the statute at issue in the case, section 443.041(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes, was "unusual," in that it directs the appellate court to "'fix'
the award.
5 79
The court recognized that the third district had observed in Cheung v.
Executive China Doral, Inc.,58 that since the statute offers no criteria for
determining the amount of an award, the common law principles in Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe,581 were applicable.5 82 The second
district agreed with the analysis of Cheung, but decided that rather than
appoint a judge as a commissioner to determine the fee, as the third district
had in Cheung, it preferred "to relinquish jurisdiction to the appeals referee
to conduct further proceedings on the matter."
583
XXVII. COSTS
In Porter v. State,584 a criminal defendant under a sentence of death,
who was represented by the Capital Collateral Representative ("CCR")
appealed from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief.585 Incident
to that appeal, the defendant filed a motion that sought to have the county
pay the cost of transcribing the various hearings in the trial court.86  In
denying the motion, the supreme court noted that in Hoffman v. Haddock,58 7
it had held that CCR is statutorily required "to provide for the collateral
576. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D930 (2d Dist. CL App. Apr. 8, 1998).
577. Id. at D930.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. 638 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
581. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1989).
582. Berry, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D930.
583. Id.
584. 700 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1997).
585. Id. at 648.
586. Id.
587. 695 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1997).
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representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state
and is to be responsible for the payment of all necessary costs and
expenses."' 588 The court went on to "clarify that [its Hoffman] decision
includes court reporter fees for transcription of the proceedings to be
included in the record on appeal., 589 The court further stated:
We rule on this motion by this opinion to express our conclusion
that payment of all postconviction costs out of CCR's budget is not
only statutorily required but is necessary to carry out the legislative
intent expressed in section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Moreover, we believe it will further the goal of accounting for and
controlling costs in postconviction proceedings and further the
efficient processing of postconviction capital cases.
590
Because postconviction costs were historically paid by the counties, the
court urged CCR and the Commission on Administration of Justice in
Capital Cases "to immediately assess the impact of these costs on CCR's
budgets in each of the CCR offices and at an early time do what is necessary
to make the legislature aware of the need to appropriate the funds to cover
these CoStS.",
5 9 1
The fifth district, in Rehman v. ECC International Corp., 59 rejected a
claim that lost interest on a cash bond posted on appeal was a recoverable
cost. The court noted Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) which
indicates that "taxable costs" shall include certain things, including the
catch-all phrase "other costs permitted by law," but does not specifically
refer to lost interest.593 The court subsequently stated:
Courts do not allow as taxable costs interest which theoretically
accrued on other kinds of costs expended by a party to an appeal,
such as the payments for transcripts, depositions, exhibits and the
like. Without an express authorization in the rules to treat
theoretical lost interest on a cash bond posted by an appellant, we
agree it should not be a taxable cost.
594
588. Porter, 700 So. 2d at 648 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Hoffman v. Haddock, 695 So. 2d
682, 684 (Fla. 1997)).
589. Id. at 648.
590. Id.
591. Id. at648-49.
592. 707 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
593. Id. at 752-53.
594. Id. at 753.
[Vol. 23:1
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/2
Musto
In Okeelanta Corp. v. Bygrave5 95 the plaintiffs brought a class action
596and obtained a final summary judgment in their favor. The defendants
appealed and the judgment was reversed for further proceedings.5 97  On
remand, four defendants moved for, and received an order taxing appellate
costs, while a fifth agreed to defer hearings on its motion for a cost judgment
until there was an ultimate prevailing party in the underlying case.598
On appeal from the order taxing costs, the fourth district agreed that "at
this point in the proceedings, absent members of the class may not be liable
for costs." 599 The court noted that "[a] judgment cannot be entered without
knowing against whom it may operate" and that "[a]t the present time, an
impediment to entering a cost judgment is the inability to identify who,
besides the class representatives, may be judgment debtors. ' 6°  The court
therefore concluded that "because it has not been established which
members of the class might ultimately be liable for these costs, we reverse
the order and direct that it be deferred until the conclusion of the case."' 0 '
In Fleitman v. McPherson,602 a petitioner sought certiorari to quash a
trial court order denying a motion to disqualify the respondents' attorney and
that attorney's law firm from representing the defendant.60 3 After the order
was quashed with respect to the disqualification of the attorney at trial, but
upheld with respect to the disqualification of the law firm, the petitioner
moved to tax costs.604 The trial court determined that since the appellate
court's "ruling affirmed in part and reversed in part, it could not be
determined which side prevailed.'"605 It "further found it must consider the
results of the entire litigation, not merely an interlocutory certiorari review,
and that it would be inappropriate to tax costs at this time."60
6
The petitioner sought review of the trial court's order, asserting that he
had prevailed in the certiorari proceeding, that he had timely moved to tax
appellate costs, that the trial court did not need to take any additional action
on the issues involved in the certiorari action, and that the applicable rules
595. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1769 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 1997).
596. Id. atD1769.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Okeelanta, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1770.
601. Id.
602. 704 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
603. Id. at 588.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
1998
61
Musto: Appellate Practice
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
and case law precluded the trial court from deferring its ruling.607 The
respondent replied that since there had been no ruling by the trial court, there
was nothing for the appellate court to review, other than the question of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in taking the motion under
advisement.
60 8
The first district found that in the certiorari proceeding, the "petitioner
prevailed on the question of disqualification of the attorney, while
respondents prevailed on the question of disqualification of the law firm."
6°9
The court went on to state that
[s]ince no further action need be taken by the trial court with
respect to the attorney disqualification issue, it appears the trial
court failed to apply the correct law, and abused its discretion, in
declining to make a determination as to the prevailing party for
purposes of an award of appellate costs with respect to the petition
for certiorari.
610
Further, the court found that the "trial court also erred in delaying a
decision as to costs pertaining to an interlocutory appeal, based on a
determination that the court must consider the results of the entire
litigation." '  The court noted that while "[a]n attorney's fee award cannot
be made until the prevailing party in the underlying litigation is
determined[,] ... the prevailing party under rule 9.400(a) is the party who
prevailed in the appellate proceeding that was the subject of the motion to
tax costs."'612 Therefore, the court reversed the order deferring ruling and
remanded "with directions to make a determination as to the party who
prevailed on the significant issue in the petition for certiorari review, and for
an award of costs."
6 13
XXVIHI. BOARD CERTIFIED APPELLATE LAWYERS
In The Florida Bar re Ash,614 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the
denial of an attorney's application for certification as a Board Certified
607. Fleitman, 704 So. 2d at 588-89.
608. Id. at 589.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Fleitman, 704 So. 2d at 590.
613. Id.
614. 701 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1997).
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Appellate Lawyer. The denial had been based on the applicant's failure to
disclose the fact than an appellate court had ordered her to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed on her for the manner in which she handled
615a particular case. On her certification application, the applicant had stated
"N/A" in response to two questions that asked her to list and explain "all
cases in which your competence or conduct was raised as a basis for [ ]
relief.. .by the court" and "all cases in which your conduct was adversely
commented upon in writing by ajudge."616
In upholding the denial of the application, the court found that the show
cause order was a document that the applicant "was unequivocally required
to disclose on her application."' 617 The court went on to state, "Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of the oath of truthfulness at the
conclusion of the application." 61 8 The court also submitted the matter to The
619Florida Bar to determine whether any disciplinary rules were violated.
XXIX. A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
The Supreme Court of Florida Judicial Management Council has
established a committee to study issues relating to per curiam affirmances
without opinions. The committee will make recommendations as to whether
written opinions should be required in all cases, whether a system should be
adopted under which some opinions are not published, and other concerns.
The Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee has recommended to the
supreme court that per curiam affirmances that do no more than provide
citations to authorities be published only in table form. The committee has
also recommended adopting a rule that would provide that the denial of an
extraordinary writ would not constitute a determination on the merits unless
the court order specifically indicates otherwise or evinces an unequivocal
determination by the court that the merits were considered. As discussed in
Part XXII.C of this article, such a rule would incorporate the conclusion
reached by the supreme court and the second district and would require the
third and fourth districts to change their approach regarding such matters.
Both the committee and the Florida Courts Technology Commission
continue to study the concept of adopting a vendor-neutral citation system.
615. Id. at 553.
616. Id.
617. Ash, 701 So. 2d at 554.
618. Id.
619. Id.
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Of course, the courts over the coming year will provide answers to
many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These
answers, as they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.
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